

EXCERPTS FROM TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF STATE
HULL GIVEN BEFORE THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK

pp. 1076 to 1083

I. BACKGROUND OF 1941 CONVERSATIONS

The Japanese proposal for conversations was directed toward the conclusion of an agreement between Japan and the United States relating to the Far East. It was made early in 1941. Before accepting or rejecting this proposal, the President and I gave the subject thorough consideration against the background of such factors as Japan's record of international aggression, her record of duplicity in international dealings, the sharp divergence between the policies traditionally and currently pursued by Japan and by the United States, and the current situation in the Far East, in Europe, and in the United States.

A. Japan's Record of Aggression:

The President and I had to bear in mind and to take into account Japan's past record of aggression and the trend of contemporary developments in the Far East.

Almost from the outset of Japan's emergence as a modern state she had been pursuing a policy of military aggrandisement. For the most part, except during certain brief periods when forces of moderation appeared to be in the ascendancy, the intervals between one aggressive step and the next were but periods of consolidation.

In 1895, following Japan's successful war against China, Japan annexed Formosa and tried unsuccessfully to establish a foothold in Manchuria.

In 1905, after the Russo-Japanese war, Japan established herself securely in Manchuria by acquiring a lease of the Kwantung territory and ownership of the South Manchuria Railway. At that time Japan also acquired southern Sakhalin.

In 1910 Japan annexed Korea after years of encroachment by pressure and intrigue.

In 1915 Japan took advantage of the preoccupation of her European allies with the war against Germany to present to China the notorious Twenty-one Demands.

At the end of the first world war Japan participated in the Washington Conference of 1921-22 and became a party to the treaties concluded there. Among those treaties was the Nine Power Treaty relating to principles and policies concerning China. That treaty envisaged the creation of conditions designed to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government. Japan pledged herself to the policies of self-restraint toward China on which the Nine Power Treaty rested.

In 1928, however, following the advent of the cabinet of General Tanaka in 1927, Japan adopted a so-called "positive" policy toward China under which it manifested an increasing disposition to intervene in China's internal affairs.

In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and subsequently established there a puppet regime under the name of "Manchukuo". By that action, which was a flagrant violation of the Nine Power Treaty, Japan broke completely away from the policy of cooperation agreed upon in the Washington Conference treaties.

I recalled how early in 1934 I welcomed an approach by the Japanese Government in the form of a note (February 21, 1934) by Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he stated that he firmly believed that no question existed between the United States and Japan "that is fundamentally incapable of amicable solution". In my reply (March 3, 1934) I concurred in that view and emphasized our Government's belief in adjustments of questions by pacific processes.

Only a short time after that exchange of notes, however, Japan again unmasked the basic purpose of aggression consistently adhered to by powerful policy-making elements in Japan. On April 17, 1934 the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman gave out a truculent official statement known as the "hands off China" statement. In that statement Japan made clear a purpose to compel China to follow Japan's dictate and to permit other countries to have relations with China only as Japan allowed.

On December 29, 1934 Japan gave formal notice of its intention to withdraw at the end of 1936 from the Naval Limitation Treaty signed at Washington on February 6, 1922. That notice was another clear and significant move in the direction of a course of conquest. Following the giving of that notice, Japan proceeded energetically to increase her armaments, preparatory to launching her invasion in China.

About that time Japan entered into conversations with Nazi Germany which resulted in the conclusion by the two countries, on November 25, 1936, of the Anti-Comintern Pact. In 1937

Italy adhered. While the Pact was ostensibly for self-protection against communism, actually it was a preparatory move for subsequent measures of forceful expansion by the bandit nations -- the first step in the creation of the so-called "Axis".

In July 1937, Japan deliberately took advantage of a minor incident between Chinese and Japanese forces at a point near Peiping and began flagrantly to invade China on a huge scale. She poured into China immense armies which spread fan-like over great areas, including industrial and other key centers. These armies raped, robbed, murdered, and committed all kinds of lawless acts. Particularly barbarous were the outrages in Nanking following occupation of that city by Japanese military on December 13, 1937.

On December 12, 1937 Japanese aircraft bombed and sank the U.S.S. Panay in the Yangtze River.

To gain public support in Japan for its program of military expansion, slogans were used such as "the new order in Greater East Asia" and "the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". The United States and other countries were charged with attempting to choke Japan's development.

In August and September 1940 Japan with German assistance extorted an agreement from Vichy France under which Japanese troops moved into northern Indochina.

In September 1940 Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. That alliance was aimed directly at the United States. It was designed to discourage the United States from taking adequate measures of self-defense until both Japan and Germany had completed their programs of conquest in Asia and Europe, when they could turn on the United States then standing alone.

On October 4, 1940 Premier Konoe was quoted by the press as a statement on the Tripartite Pact has having said in part:

"If the United States refuses to understand the real intentions of Japan, Germany and Italy and continues persistently its challenging attitude and acts ... those powers will be forced to go to war. Japan is now endeavoring to adjust Russo-Japanese political and economic relations and will make every effort to reduce friction between Japan and Russia. Japan is now engaged in diplomatic manœuvres to induce Russia, Britain and the United States to suspend their operations in assisting the Chiang regime."

B. Japan's Record of Duplicity:

The President and I also gave thought to the fact that Japan had a long record of duplicity in international dealings. This duplicity was due largely to the fact that the Japanese military were a law unto themselves and consistently overrode commitments which civilian Japanese had given.

In 1904, Japan guaranteed Korea's independence and territorial integrity. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea.

In 1908, Japan pledged with the United States to support the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity there. In 1915, Japan presented to China the notorious "twenty-one demands."

In 1918, Japan entered into an inter-allied arrangement whereby forces, not exceeding above 7,000 by any one power, were to be sent to Siberia to guard military stores which might be subsequently needed by Russian forces, to help the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense, and to aid the evacuating Czechoslovakian forces in Siberia. The Japanese military saw in this enterprise an opportunity, in which they were eventually unsuccessful, to annex eastern Siberia and sent more than 70,000 troops.

In the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, Japan agreed to respect China's sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity. Japan also agreed to use its influence to establish the principle of equal opportunity there. Japan's whole course in China since 1931 of military occupation and economic domination was in violation of those pledges.

On November 21, 1932, Mr. Matsuoka, then Japanese delegate to the League of Nations, said: "We want no more territory." By the end of 1932 Japanese forces had occupied the whole of Manchuria and in subsequent years they moved southward and westward occupying a vast area of China.

On July 27, 1937, Prince Konoe, then Japanese Premier, said "In sending troops to North China, of course, the Government had no other purpose, as was explained in its recent statement, than to preserve the peace of East Asia." In order to "preserve the peace of East Asia," Japanese forces for four years had carried warfare and suffering over the greater part of China.

On October 28, 1937, the Japanese Foreign Office said, "Japan never looks upon the Chinese people as an enemy . . ." Japan showed its friendly feeling for China by bombing Chinese civilian populations, by burning Chinese cities, by making millions of Chinese homeless and destitute, by mistreating and killing civilians, and by acts of horror and cruelty.

On April 15, 1940, Mr. Arita, then Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, said the "Japanese Government cannot but be deeply concerned over any development ... that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies". Following the occupation of the Netherlands by Germany that spring, Japan sent a Commercial Commission to the Indies which asked concessions so far reaching that, if granted, they would have reduced the Indies practically to a Japanese colony.

After the outbreak of Japan's undeclared war against China in July 1937, Japanese civilian leaders time and again gave assurances that American rights would be respected. Time and again the Japanese military acted in violation of those assurances...

pp. 1084- to 1088

Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American lives and property in China would be respected. Yet there were reported in steadily mounting numbers cases of bombing of American property with consequent loss or endangering of American lives.

Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American treaty rights in China would be respected. Unnumbered measures infringing those rights were put into effect in Japanese occupied areas. Trade monopolies were set up, discriminatory taxes were imposed, American properties were occupied, and so on. In addition, American nationals were assaulted, arbitrarily detained, and subjected to indignities.

C. Divergence between Japanese and American Policies:

The President and I have very much in mind the fact that the United States and Japan had widely different concepts and policies. We went over the successive steps our Government had taken to influence Japan to adopt peaceful policies.

We recalled that Japan's action in 1931 in embarking on a course of aggression, expansion by force and of disregard of treaties had ushered in an ever widening conflict between force of aggression and those desirous of maintaining peace. Our Government's opposition to Japan's course in Manchuria was set forth in a communication addressed by the then Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, to the Japanese Government on January 7, 1933 and in a further communication of February 25, 1935, to the Secretary General of the League of Nations.

On January 17, 1933 the President-elect, Mr. Roosevelt, made clear his support of the principle of sanctity of international

treaties by writing out, in reply to a question, a statement as follows:

"I am ... wholly willing to make it clear that American foreign policies must uphold the sanctity of international treaties. That is the cornerstone on which all relations between nations must rest."

In his first inaugural address, on March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt said that in the field of world policy he would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor--"the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others--the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors."

Thus in 1931-1933, while Japan was carrying forward its program of aggression, the American Government was moving steadily ahead in advocacy of world support of sanctity of treaties and peaceful processes.

On May 16, 1934 I had a general conversation with Japanese Ambassador Saito, one of many conversations in which I endeavored to convince the Japanese that their best interests lay in following policies of peace.

Three days later I talked again with the Japanese Ambassador. During the conversation the Ambassador repeated the formula which his Government had been putting forward publicly for some weeks to the effect that Japan had a superior and special function in connection with the preservation of peace in Eastern Asia. I brought to the Japanese Ambassador's attention the clear implications contained in the Japanese formula of the intention on the part of Japan to exercise an overlordship over neighboring nations and territories.

On June 12, 1936 in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, I told the Ambassador that the impression of the American people was that Japan sought economic domination first of eastern Asia and then of other areas such as it might select, and that this would ultimately mean political as well as military domination. I urged upon the Ambassador the benefit to Japan from its associating itself in a peaceful and constructive program.

Despite all our pleas and efforts, Japan in July 1937 proceeded to invade China. Therefore, on July 16 the Government of the United States issued a statement of fundamental principles of international policy which was directed at rallying all countries to the support of peaceful processes.

In a further statement of August 23, 1937, I applied the principles of the July 16 statement expressly to the situation in China. I stated that the issues, in that situation, of concern to the United States went far beyond the immediate question of the protection of American nationals and American interests. Serious hostilities in any part of the world were of concern to all nations. Accordingly, I urged on both the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they refrain from hostilities.

On October 6, 1937 the American Government stated that the action of Japan in China was inconsistent with the principles which should govern relationships between nations and was contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

In November 1937 the United States participated with eighteen other nations in a conference held at Brussels to "study peaceable means of hastening the end of the regrettable conflict which prevails" in the Far East. The conference was held in accordance with a provision of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922. The repeated refusals of the Japanese Government to participate in the conference effectively prevented efforts to bring about an end to the conflict by mediation and conciliation. On November 24 the conference suspended its sittings.

pp. 1089.

On April 15, 1940 the Japanese Foreign Minister issued a statement disclosing an underlying purpose to extend Japanese control to the South Seas regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies. On April 17 I took cognizance of that statement. I pointed out the importance of the Netherlands Indies in international relationships. I said that intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security, not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area. I urged that peaceful principles be applied not only in every part of the Pacific area but in every part of the world.

p. 1090

During the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941 I had clearly in mind-- and I was explaining to members of Congress and other Americans with whom I can in contact-- that it was apparent that the Japanese military leaders were starting on a mission of conquest of the entire Pacific area west of a few hundred miles of Hawaii and extending to the South Seas and to India. The Japanese were out with force, in collaboration with Hitler to establish a new world order, and they thought they had the power to compel all peaceful nations to come in under that new order in the half of the world they had arrogated to themselves.

I was saying to these Americans that beginning in 1933 I had commenced a systematic and consistently earnest effort to work out our relations with Japan. I had been trying to see whether it was humanly possible to find any way to approach the Japanese and prevail on them to abandon this movement of conquest. We had been urging the Japanese to consider their own future from the standpoint of political, economic, and social aspects.

p. 1092

The President had an eye to the situation in the Far East when on January 6, 1941 in his address to Congress he declared that "at no previous time has American security been as seriously threatened from without as it is today". The President said that the whole pattern of democratic life had been blotted out in an appalling number of independent nations and that the assailants were still on the march threatening other nations, great and small.

p. 1093

On January 15, 1941, in a statement in support of the Lend-Lease Act before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, I said:

"It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the start by broad and arbitrary plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arms and thus to make themselves master of an area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that region."

I pointed out that mankind was face to face with an organized, ruthless and implacable movement of steadily expanding conquests, and that control of the high seas by law-abiding nations "is the key to the security of the Western Hemisphere".

pp. 1103 to 1109

II. CONVERSATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO JULY 1941.

On February 14, 1941 the President received the new Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, in a spirit of cordiality and said that they could talk candidly. He pointed out that relations between the United States and Japan were deteriorating and mentioned Japanese movements southward and Japanese entry into the Tripartite Agreement. The President suggested that the Ambassador might like to re-examine and frankly discuss with the Secretary of State important phases of American-Japanese relations.

On March 8, in my first extended conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, I emphasized that the American people had become fully aroused over the German and Japanese movements to take charge of the seas and of the other continents for their own arbitrary control and to profit at the expense of all of the victims.

On March 14 the Japanese Ambassador saw the President and me. The President agreed with an intimation by the Ambassador that matters between our two countries could be worked out without a military clash and emphasized that the first step would be removal of suspicion regarding Japan's intentions. With the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on his way to Berlin, talking loudly, and Japanese naval and air forces moving gradually toward Thailand, there was naturally serious concern and suspicion.

On April 16 I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador. I pointed out that the one paramount preliminary question about which our Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to abandon its present doctrine of conquest by force and to adopt four principles which our Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between nations should rest, as follows:

- (1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations;
- (2) Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries;
- (3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity;
- (4) Non-disturbance of the status quo in the

Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

I told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as would be consistent with these principles.

On May 12 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal for a general settlement. The essence of that proposal was that the United States should request Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate peace with Japan, and, if Chiang should not accept the advice of the United States, that the United States should discontinue its assistance to his Government; that normal trade relations between the United States and Japan should be resumed; and that the United States should help Japan acquire access to facilities for the exploitation of natural resources--such as oil, rubber, tin and nickel--in the southwest Pacific area. There were also other provisions which Japan eventually dropped, calling for joint guarantee of independence of the Philippines, for the consideration of Japanese immigration to the United States on a non-discriminatory basis, and for a joint effort by the United States and Japan to prevent the further extension of the European war and for the speedy restoration of peace in Europe.

The proposal also contained an affirmation of Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact and a specific reference to Japan's obligations thereunder to come to the aid of any of the parties thereto if attacked by a power not at that time in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict, other than the Soviet Union which was expressly excepted.

The peace conditions which Japan proposed to offer China were not defined in clear-cut terms. Patient exploring, however, disclosed that they included stipulations disguised in innocuous-sounding formulas whereby Japan would retain control of various strategic resources, facilities and enterprises in China and would acquire the right to station large bodies of Japanese troops, professedly for "joint defense against Communism," for an indefinite period in extensive key areas of China proper and Inner Mongolia.

Notwithstanding the narrow and one-sided character of the Japanese proposals, we took them as a starting point to explore the possibility of working out a broad-gauge settlement, covering the entire Pacific area, along lines consistent with the principles for which this country stood.

On May 14, Mr. Matsukata, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the course of a conversation with Ambassador Grew, said that both Prince Konoe and he were determined that Japan's southward advance should be carried out only by peaceful means, "unless," he added significantly, "circumstances render this impossible."

In reply to the Ambassador's inquiry as to what circumstances he had in mind, Mr. Matsuoka referred to the concentration of British troops in Malaya and other British measures. When the Ambassador pointed out that such measures were of a defensive character, the Minister's reply was that these measures were regarded as provocative by the Japanese public, which might bring pressure on the Government to act.

On May 27, 1941, President Roosevelt proclaimed the existence of an "unlimited national emergency" and in a radio address on the same day he declared that our whole program of aid for the democracies had been based on concern for our own security. He warned of the conditions which would exist should Hitler be victorious.

The President and I were sure that the proclamation would be noticed not only by Hitler but also by the Japanese war lords.

On May 28 I told the Japanese Ambassador that I had it in mind before passing from our informal conversations into any negotiations with Japan to talk out in strict confidence with the Chinese Government the general subject matter involved in the proposals.

During the next few weeks there were a number of conversations for the purpose of clarifying various points and narrowing areas of difference. We repeatedly set forth our attitude on these points--the necessity of Japan's making clear its relation to the Axis in case the United States should be involved in self-defense in the war in Europe; application of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country and withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory; application of the principle of non-discrimination in commercial relations in China and other areas of the Pacific and assurance of Japan's peaceful intent in the Pacific. I emphasized that what we were seeking was a comprehensive agreement which would speak for itself as an instrument of peace.

The Japanese pressed for a complete reply to their proposals of May 12. Accordingly, on June 21, the Ambassador was given our views in the form of a tentative redraft of their proposals. In that redraft there was suggested a formula which would make clear that Japan was not committed to take action against the United States should the latter be drawn by self-defense into the European war. It was proposed that a further effort be made to work out a satisfactory solution of the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China and of the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. There also was eliminated any suggestion that the United States would discontinue aid to the Chinese Government. Various other suggested changes were proposed in the interest of clarification or for the purpose of harmonizing the proposed settlement with our stated principles.

ext/1106

Doc 2007B

一。七 B

粵珠澳政事審查二對人議會共同委員會，
前二行公タル八九國務長官，證言拔萃

一〇六一六三頁

一、一九四一年／昭和十六年／會議背景

會議二討日本，提議八、極東三國不日米向，協定，總結
指向了原。甚八九四一年／昭和十六年／，初期三提起。此，
提議了受議久，並不下前二、大統領上余此向題向
日本，國際的侵略，記錄、日本，國際的行動，於三重性
記錄、日本，合衆國依，傳統的又現在遂行了。居
兩國改采，確然此相達及，極東、歐洲、甚合衆國
於現情勢等，原因背景二討、十分考應。總結。

A 日本，侵略記錄

大統領及余日本，過去，侵略的記錄上，同時、極東，
於此發展的傾向，今頭置，又之，考應二合十九
八十九十九。

日本，近代的國家上，產生之，始最初，軍事的擴大
政策，實行。權力，得，或短期間，除，

其大部分期間中一侵略階段後，階段上，中間期間八
單三埠草圖整理，期間多過半カシタ。

一八九五年（明治廿八年）日本文那二村入滿洲之成功之後
台灣併合，滿洲於是歸建設，但日本之失敗
也。

一九〇五年（明治三十八年）日露戰役後日本八閩粵州三對允租
借權，獲得之南滿洲鐵道，銀有之滿洲之確半名地盤
之築修。同時二四年八南樺太之獲得也。

一九〇九年（明治三十二年）日本八多年，侵害，後壓迫上海謀
朝鮮併合也。

一九一五年（大正四年）日本歐洲聯合國對獨戰爭中
干涉半利用シテカ，惡紅二十六國條約要求中國三十六
年多。第一次世界大戰，結束於日本一九二二年（大正
十年）十一月，華盛頓會議參加之同會議於德結セタ
諸條約，謂印國下カシタ。是年，條約中之中國三十六原則
及改東三閩連有合九國條約包含セテ居タ、ノ條約ハ
中國之實力，不安全定シテ政府之育成，且維持化為三九會員
最重無害，機會之狀態能創造セラヒヨト期待也。

日本八九國條約基礎，上記，中國三對八國制的政策
誓約也。然シカ一九二六年（昭和二年）田中內閣之後、日本
一九二八年（昭和三年）六中國三對之所謂積極政策採用シテ
ノ改策，下之為中國，由改三千萬人向來カシタ。

一九三一年（昭和六年）六日本滿洲之侵略，其為滿洲國
名稱，七十二之，統治之傀儡政府，樹立也。九國條約，

極要心に違背する」、行爲二三〇日中八華盛頓會議、諸條約二協定を了々協力改築了完全二段葉了了了。

一九三四年四月十七日、日本外務省より代締者ハガハ支那事務
出入ハガハ、支那事務上二月十七日、支那事務上二月、野蠻の公、聲明ヲ
ナシタ。又、聲明二五三、中華人民共和国二二年四月、指圖三從
ヲ下し強制より日本が許容在場令ハ他、國上中國上文
説ハ許入下言了目的明ナシタ。

Doc 2007 B

一九三四年／昭和九年／十一月二十九日、日本、一九三六年／昭和十一年、
一九三二年／大正十一年／二月六日「ワシントン」於テ調印セラシタル
海軍制限條約ヲ、脱退セし意圖ヲ公式ニ通告シタ。
其、通告ハ、征服、行程、向、明瞭且、意議化動キテ、
其、通告、提出次第、日本、中國侵略、開始シテ、其、軍備
増強、過淮シ。

其頃、日本、ナケ獨逸、會議入、結果、

一九三六年／昭和十一年／二月二二日、防共協定が兩國ヨリ締結セラシ。
一九三七年／昭和十二年／伊太利が調印シ。同物是、表面、其產
主義、對外、自己防衛、アリが、實際、其、後、匪賊國家、依
「武力的發展」手綱、為、準備工作、——所謂「起動」、創造、
第一步、——アリ。

一九三七年／昭和十二年／七月、日本、北京附近、一地點、於中國軍隊
ト日本軍隊、間、起、小事件、故意、利用、大規模、中國侵略
ヲ、非道、開始シタ。日本、尤大、軍隊、中國、注、近、ト、八、
虐業、其他、重要、中心地、含、廣大、地域、扇狀、擴張シ。是等
、軍隊、凌辱、掠奪、殺人、其他、凡、不法、行為、犯シ、特、野蠻
シタ、ハ、一九三七年／昭和十二年／七月十三日、日本軍隊、南京、占領、三次
、奉行、ト、同市、於、其、暴虐、アリ。

No. 4
一九三七年／昭和二年／十一月十日、日本航空機、揚子江、合衆國軍艦
ノ、山、爆撃、之、擊沈、シ。

2007 B

軍事的發展、計画三、日本於不寧國民、支持得ノク為大東亞重新佈序
入大東亞共榮國、下云々以下標語が用ヒテ。合衆國其他國、日本、
英、法、荷、印、新、西、南、非、難、南、美、

一九四〇年、昭和十五年、八月及九月、日本の獨逸後助下三行、
佛蘭西下協定、無理、浩、其協定下、日本軍隊、北部印度支那
進入。

一九四〇年、昭和十五年、九月、日本、獨逸及、伊太利、三國同盟ヲ
締結。右同盟、直接合衆國、目的、ト、日本下。七八日本、獨
逸兩國が亞細亞及、歐羅巴征服、計画、完了。兩國が獨立、合衆國
三五、向、二、が出来、合衆國が、九、八、自衛手段、保有、妨げ
為、企圖、サリ、ア。

一九四〇年、昭和十五年、十月四日、並衛、首相、三國同盟、ノルマニ声明、
一部、次、如、言、ノ、ト、新聞、書、カ。

合衆國、日本獨逸及、伊太利、其、意、ヲ、理解、人、コト、拒否、執拗
三、挑戦的態度、及、行為、實、於、一、是等、諸國、戰、行、ル、得
ト、十、九、年、ノ、日本、自、下、日、聲、政治、及、經濟、關係、調整、ノ、事、努力、半
年、又、日本、於、西、亞、上、同、摩、豫、減、化、為、凡、正、事、力、ヲ、為、不、ア、ノ、
日本、今、西、亞、英、國、及、合、衆、國、が、彼、等、其、政、權、獲、助、行、動、ノ、中、
化、權、被、等、論、據、ノ、外、交、工、作、ノ、行、ノ、居、

No. 6

2007B

B. 日本、泰東的言動、記錄

大統領余六、亦日本が國際關係於ア泰東的言動ヲ為シ、長
記録有スル事實、考ヘ。コ、泰東的言動、日本軍部が彼自
身、法律アリ日本、文官が約束シテ事ヲ終始一貫シテ蹂躪シキ
事云々、事實大々起因スルモ、アリ。

一九〇四年(明治三七年)日本、朝鮮、獨立其領土保全ヲ保證
シテ、一九〇五年(明治三四年)日本、朝鮮ヲ併合シ。

一九〇八年(明治四二年)日本、アメリカ合衆國と共に中國、獨立保
全、及中國於テ機會均等、原則ヲ支持スルコトヲ誓約シ。

一九一五年(大正四年)日本、ア、惡名アル「二十一箇條、要求」ヲ中國ニ
宣ケタ。

一九一八年(大正七年)日本、露西亞軍が其後山要トスルカモ知
テ、軍需ヲ保護スル為、露西亞人自身、自衛機關、組織、援助
不為、及シベリア、於ケルナリコスルキア軍、撤退ヲ放棄ス
ル為、各國、夫々七十人、超ハサル兵力、シベリア、派遣スルト言
聯合國間、取極メ、參加シ。日本軍部、コ、事業、東部、シ
ベリア併合、好機アリ見テ、(結果成功シカシ)、七万人以上、兵
力、派遣シ。

一九二三年(大正十二年)ト、九ヶ國條約、於テ日本、中國、主權、
獨立、及領土的行政的保全、尊重スルコト同意シ。日本、
亦中國於テ機會均等、原則ヲ樹立スルコトニ盡力スルコト同意
シ。

一九三二年(昭和六年)以降中國、於ケル日本、軍事的占領、各
經濟的支配、全課程、是等、誓約侵犯アリ。

一九三三年(昭和七年)十一月二十日、當時國際聯盟、派遣、日本代表

1937.7.13
ノリタケ松園氏公爵、領土を欲せし上言より、一九三三年（昭和八年）、未遂日本軍、滿洲全土ヲ占領。其後、歲月三八、南方及西方行動ヒテ廣大之中國、地域ヲ占領スルニ至リ。

1937.7.14
一九三七年（昭和十二年）六月二十七日、當時、日本首相近衛公爵ハ北支ハ、軍隊派遣ニ當リテハ、政府ハ「最近」、聲明ニモ連ベテ、如、東亞、平和維持以外勿論何等、目的モ有スルモノハナリ。下述ベテ申シ。東亞、平和ヲ維持シタルメ、日本軍ハ四年三月ニテ中國大部分、地域ニ戰争ト苦難ヲ齎シシ。

1937.7.15
一九三七年（昭和十二年）六月二十八日、日本外務省ハ日本ハ決シテ中國民衆ヲ敵視モハナリ、上述ベテ申シ。日本ハ中國ニ對スルハ、友情ヲ、一般中國民衆ヲ爆轟シ中國、諸都市ヲ焼、幾百万、中國人、家ヲ奪ニ生計、道ヲ絶キ。一般人ニ虐待殺戮入ルコトニ依リテ又恐怖、慘虐、行為ニ依リテ示シ。

1937.7.16
一九三七年（昭和十五年）四月十五日、當時、日本外相有田氏ハ、日本政府ハ蘭領東印度、現狀ニ影響ヲ及ボスベキ如何ナニ進展、
ニ對シテモ深、憂慮セサハ得ナシ上述ベテ、ノ、春、独立ニ
ヨルハ蘭施占領ニ次ハテ日本ハ商業使節團ヲ蘭印ニ送、
若シシカ容ヒタル場合ハ蘭印ヲシテ實際ニ日本ノ殖民地ハシル
ガ如キ譲歩ヲ要求シ。

1937.7.17
一九三七年（昭和十三年）六月、中國ニ對スル日本、宣戰、布告ナキ戰
争勃發後、日本、民間指導者達ハアリカ、權利ニ尊重
サルベキ旨屢々保證シ。日本陸軍ハ屢々ノ保證ニ違背

1937.7

Dec 2007 B

スル行動二五

自 一〇八頁一〇八頁

日本・韓・中國三於アメリカ人、生命及び財産の尊重ハキ旨保証シテ。

シカモアメリカ人、生命、損失・危険ヲ伴フアメリカ財産爆弾事件ハ確実ニ増加スル數ヲ以テ報告セラレッテアリ。

日本・韓・中國三於アメリカ、條約上、権利の尊重ハキ旨保証シテ。コレ、権利ヲ侵犯スル無數措置が日本占領地域於テ実施セラレバ、通商獨占が行ハシ差別的・税が課セラシ、アメリカ財産が差押合シテ等々。カル=アメリカ人ハ襲撃サシ不法・抑留サシ侮辱ヲ受ケシ。

No. 8

Doc 20073

C 日本、政策上米國、政策上、相違

米國上日本上ハ非常ニ懸念隔也此概念上政策上有スル事実
ヲ大統領ト余ハ深々念頭ニ置ケテ居ク吾々ハ我が政府が
日本ヲニテ平和的政策ヲ採ルヤウニ仕向ケル為ニ順次將來
之手段ヲ検討シタ。

吾々ハ一九三一年(昭和六年)ニ日本が武力下條約無視トニル
侵略及擴張、行動ニ象出シテシニシテ侵略的勢力ト平和
維持希望者ト向ニ益々加ニ衝突先駆ア爲シタモ、
テアシトア思出シタ。滿洲ニ於ケル日本、乃都ニ討ニル我が
政府、及時ハ一九三三年(昭和八年)一月七日附當時國務
長官入谷ソノ長ヨリ日本政府宛、通達及一九三五年
(昭和十年)三月二十九日附國際聯盟事務局長宛、
通達ニモ述ベシタ。

No. 9

10/6.

言日後二命ハ再び日本大使上会談シタ。会談中大使ハ日本政府が日本ハ東西、平和維持ニ關シテ侵越セル特殊ナ往務務ヲ持ツ日本ハトテノ趣旨ニ當通じ亘リ公ニ提唱シテ居

Doc 2007B

一九三三年／昭和八年／一月十七日選出大統領ルーズベルト
大統領就任時ノ回答シテ、次、如半声明書ヲ出スコトニ
依ツテ彼、國際條約神聖原則支持ヲ明カシタ。

「余ハ、アメリカ、外交政策ハ國際條約、神聖ヲ支持セ
ネバナラストイコトヲ終ニ達シテ明カスル。コレコソ國家間、
凡テノ關係が依ツテ以テ立ツベキ礎石アル。」

ルーズベルト大統領ハ一九三三年三月四日、最初就任演説ニ於テ彼ハ舊政政策、領野ニ於テコノ國ヲ善隣政
策、断乎トシテ自己ヲ尊重シソしが故ニ他、權利ヲモ
尊重スル隣人、自己、義務ヲ尊重シ隣人、其界ニ於ケ
スハソレト同、彼、協定、神聖ヲ尊重スル隣人ニ接ハル
旨ヲ述べタ。

カクシテ一九三一年／昭和六年／ヨリ一九三三年／昭和八年／
三月テ日本ガリ、侵略計畫ヲ進メルアツタ時、アメリカ政
府ハ條約ト平和的方法、神聖ヲ尊重的ニ支持スルコトヲ提唱シテ
着実ニ前進シル乃ルアリ。

一九三四年五月十六日余ハ日本大使有希上一般的会談ヲ行
リシハ余ハ日本側ニ彼等、最大、利益ハ平和政策従フ事
アルコトヲ證得シヤクト努力シテ、多々、会談、シテアリ。

言日後二命ハ再び日本大使上会談シタ。会談中大使ハ

日本政府が日本ハ東西、平和維持ニ關シテ侵越セル特殊ナ往
務務ヲ持ツ日本ハトテノ趣旨ニ當通じ亘リ公ニ提唱シテ居

Doc 2007B

常奮譲ノ件延シタ。近隣諸國ノ領土ニ対シ西朝權ヲ保テ、
ソトニルハ日本側之意圖アルトキノ意味ガ既曉ニ日本側、
常奮譲ニ合ハシテ既ニ日本大使、注意ヲ擧紀シタ。

昭和十一年六月十二日駐英日本大使、会談、降日本ハ
車重ヲ船メ次ハテリ、外ニ好ニ地域ニ計ニ終焉的支配ヲ及
ボサントシ年化然シテ以上ハ該局軍事的支配、シテナリ
政治的支配モ意味スルトキハ米國市民、受ク印象
テ居トクシタ。余ハ大使ニ平和的且建設的計画ニ自ラ策
シハヨリ日本ニ利益ナル事以テ力説シタ。

No. 11

Doc. 2007B

No. 12

威及人民說得努力三天拘禁日本一九三七年七月
支那侵襲開始シテ、一九三七年七月十六日合衆國政府和平的方
式持之對三八國科合セト化國際的政策、根本原則三原則
聲明書ヨ出生シテ。

更一九三七年八月二十三日、聲明書於一九三七年七月十六日、聲明
書、原則ヨ明白三支那於此不態適用シテ。
余、了夢ヨ當リ、合衆國が開心不論半島、米國國民並
シ米國利權、保護上云々自下問題ニ遼ケ以テ、尤、不比上述
重大十戰勝國態世界、如何九郎會於三民化國家、開
心不啻シテ。故余、中國並日本兩政府ニ對之敵對行為ヲ
制止志精、萬物信シテ。

一九三七年四月十一日日本國政府ニ支那於日本、
一九三七年四月十一日日本國政府ニ支那於日本、
約行勸、國家同關係ヨ律入ヘテ原則ニ合致ヤ又九國條
約反シテリテノ事、協定、規定皆モ、十九三七年声明シテ。
一九三七年十月、合衆國他十分國共極東、萬葉聲
遺憾心開等、終始ヨ促進和平的手段、研究化シテ
アラ化、於開催カヒ化會議、参加シテ。右會議
一九三二年、九國條約、規定從開催カヒ。右會議參
加許入日本政府再ニ、拒否、調停、和解、依、開等

2007B

終是ノ前顧ニテ大心努力ヲ了實上阻害シ。9.十一日一千四日會議
行ノ用會事備止シ。

一千九百四十年/昭和十五年/四月十五日日本外相、南洋
地域諸島領東印度日本支配ヲ擴張セシム根本目的ヲ顯
ス。聲明ヲ發表シ。四月十七日余其聲明ヲ知シ。余、國際關係
係於此蘭領印度、重要性指摘シ。

余、平和的方策ニ優心以外、蘭領内政問題三千事以上其問題
ヲ變更セシム心トハ蘭印、地域於此ノミナラズ全太平洋地域於
此安定、平和反心完全ノ有害ノ此可半途ヘ。余、平和
諸原則於太平洋、居域於テノミナラズ世界、居域ニモ適用セラル
可キヲ主張シ。下。

一千九百四十年/昭和十五年春カラ一千九百四十年/昭和十六年
春カラ。余、日本軍部、指導者達オ布呪、數百哩西方ヨリ南
洋及印度ニ全太平洋地域征服、使命。聲是シシテ心模
様。シテ心ニ記シ且其旨國會議事及余等間
其他、未人説明シテ居。日本人世界新秩序ヲ建設スル
為。ヒントラ、合作、武力ヲ以テ上。而シテ彼等心彼等が自己
モ、舊秩序世界、洋介於此新秩序下。全平和的國
を參加セシム力ヲ持シ上也。

16.13

16.14

Doc. 2007 B

余が二九三三年／昭和八年／カラ余が對日關係ヲ解決不^{タメ}、組織的且堅実ニ^テ眞摯ナル努力ヲ開始シテヰトヲ大寧米人ニ^テ居タ、余自日本人ニ接道此、征服、行動ヲヤル事ニ彼等ヲ説服^ス何等力、方途^ス見出^ストガ人智^ス出来得ルトカ否カ^ス知^ルウト試^ミ居タ、我々日本人ニ對シテ政治、經濟及^シ社會的見地カ^ス彼等自身、將來^ス考慮心^ス強調^シ居^タテ了^ス。

大統領が一千九百四十二年／昭和十六年／一月六日議会^ス入^ス彼、演說中^ス米國、安全が今日程外部ヨリ由^シク脅威^ス受^ケタルトハ曾^ニ無^クト公言^シタ時彼ハ經東、情勢^ス着眼シテナ、大統領ハ民主主義的生命、全型式^スが驚^ク程多數、獨立國家ニ於^テ株殺サレタ而シテ侵略者ハ他、大小諸國家ヲ脅威^シシ更^ニ二行進^ス續^ケ居^タ遂^ベタ。

一千九百四十二年／昭和十六年／一月十五日下院、外交委員会^ス提出^シ「武威^ス與法安^ス支持化陳述^シ余^ハ左、如^ク述^ベタ。
「日本が西太平洋、全域^ス於^テ支配的、地位^ス自己^ス確立セ^ント入^ル、
「萬國^スニ^テ霸氣^ス満^タ計画^ス体^ステ最初カ^ス活動^シ來^ル、
「終始一貫^ス、明白^ス凡^タ、日本、指導者達ハ武力^ス休^ム其^ス、
地位^ス獲得^シ維持^シス^テ自己^ス世界全人口、約三億、^ス合^シ、
地域^ス支配者^スシメントス^スハ彼等、決意^ス公然^ス宣言^シ、
其^ス結果上^ス、彼等ハ其^ス地域^ス於^テ海^ス上^ス航路^ス及^シ通商路^ス、專^シ、
斷^シ的支配^ス獲得^ストニ^テハ^シテ^リ」

余^ハ着^クシテ^ス擴大^ス征服、組織的殘忍且^シ執拗^ス行動^ス、
二人類が直面^シ居^タト甚^シ法^ス遵守^ス、諸國家^ス公海^ス、
「支配^シ西半球、安全、鍵^ス下^ルト^ス指^シシ^ク」。

16.15

Doc. 2007B

自一〇三頁至一〇九頁

一、一九四一年／昭和十六年／七月以前、會議及ビ展開

一九四一年／昭和十六年／三月十四日大統領ハ新日本大使野村大介
ヲ衷心ヨリ喜び迎ヘ二人ハ率直ニ語リ合フコトが出来ルト云ヒ
マシタ。彼ハ日米間ノ關係が悪化シツツアルコトヲ指摘シ日本、
南進ヤ三國同盟加入ニ云及シマシタ。大統領ハ大使が國務長
官ト日米關係、重大局面ヲ再検討シ率直ニ協議入ルが望マシイ
コトヲアルト申シマシタ。

三月八日日本大使ト、最初、長時間、會議ニ於ケル余ハドイツ
及ビ日本が身勝手ニ太平洋及ビ諸大陸ヲ支配セントシテ進軍
シ且犠牲者達、アラビア半島ノ無ニシテ利益ヲ得シト入ル活動
ニ对于米國民ハコトモナク激昂シテヰトコトヲ強調シタ。

三月十四日日本大使ハ大統領ト和ニ会見シマシタ。大統領ハ我々
二國向角題ヲ武力的ニ衝突スルトナシニ解決出来ルト言フ
大使、暗示ニ賛成シ先少少一年頃ハ日本、意圖ニ閣入疑惑
ヲ除去スルコトアラウトカ説シシタ。日本外相松岡氏が華々シ
ヲ豪語テベリニ向フヤラ日本、海空軍部隊が漸次泰國、
方ニ移動シテアルヤラハ重大ハ心ヤ疑惑が存シテ居タハ
言迄モナリテス。

Doc. 2007 B

16. 16

四月十六日 札、日本大使ト更二会談ト事ハシ。

余ハ我が政府が内心有る最も主要ノ前提問題ハ日本政府が武力三條ル征服トイフ現在、主義ヲ潔ク施業心意トカヲ持且我が政府が各國民關係、依化ダ根柢、見徴言牛次、也四綱領ヲ採用スルハ明瞭ナ事前、保證ヲ下シテ指摘シ。

(一) 各國民及凡て國民、貞士、保全及主權ヲ尊重スルト。

(二) 他國、内政三綱領不干涉原則ヲ守ルト。

(三) 商業、機會均等ヲ含、均等主義ヲ守ルト。

(四) 平和的手段三條ル現状變更以外太平洋三綱領現状ヲ観念又下。

余ハ日本大使三載我が政府ハ以上、原則ニ沿フ如キモトハ日本政府、如何ナ提案ニテ考慮スル旨ヲ傳合シ。

五月十三日、日本大使ハ一般的解決計画提案ヲ提出シ。

ソ、提案、要領、合衆國ハ蔣介石ニ日本和平交渉スル、
特要請入代キテ、モレ一蔣が合衆國、右勸告ヲ受ケテ不
場合六、合衆國ハ蔣政府ハ援助ヲ傳スベキモル、又米國立
常十二通商実係ヲ復活スベキテアリ、且合衆國ハ日本ヲハ爾
西太平洋地域、天然資源、例ヘ石油、コム、銅、ニシケルト云
如キ、ノ内發入便宜、得是化キテルトコトヲ、其地
日本ハ後ニテヲ撤回シテシテアリシ、独立ニ付合衆國ト日本
共同保障、要求無差別待遇ヲ以テ合衆國ハ日本人居住
考慮スベキ事及合衆國上層上層關係、即ハ戰爭、擴大防
止事、等、合意、合意、和平、決策ナル解決、要求、本ノ條貞元
トニシケル。

Doe. 2007 B

7
十頁

日本中國三提出シ和平條件ハ、ハキシ用語明確規定シ
ハナカタ、カシガラ舟心=吟味ストシラ、條件ニ一見何、塞障モ
ナヤナキリス、假面ヲカバタ規約テハガリニヨリテ日本ハ中國治
様ヲ戰略資源、便宜、諸事業、支配ヲ保持シ又未画上ハ
主義、對外共同防備、等ト無期限、中國全土及蒙古治
廣範囲、要衝地域、日本軍、大部隊駐屯し、其權利ヲ獲得シ
トハ、事実上判明シ。

日本側申公偏決、且、一方的、主拘、入我ハ廣範囲、解決
感、其可能性、見、出入港、出發港、上港、申出、取引、
、解決以此國、則、于半處、原則、一致、該、全太平洋地域、
包括入、モ、ア。

五月十四日日本外相松岡氏ハ、ハ大使、書類、降、
、日本、南方、准、ハ、只管和平的手段、司、行、其事、上、

決意シテ云々が同様事態がシテ不可能ナリニス限」ト意味深長ト言フ附加フ。

「事態トイフ何ヲ意味シテルカト大使問答ア松岡
代バキス軍ニ集結他キス側對策二言及シ。大倭ク
對策何モ防衛的モア下ルトト外相日本國民彼ハシラ般
對策ノ政府何等ク行動ヲ取ル事ヲ強ヒル挑發的モア下ル見
放三事ナト答ア。

一九四一年二月十七日ル大統領ハ國家的超非常時十事ヲ
宣言同日ナオ演説我民主主義擁護東總テ我國保全
計事基アキルトコトヲ言明シ。大統領ハトウクノ勝利
ヲ占多場合發生スルト心ハ事態就テ警告シ。大統領ト余ハ
「宣言カシト」ミテ日本軍部將官達ニ留意サク軍事確信
シル。九月三日私ハ我及非公式會談ヲ日本交渉人前ニ中國政府
ト胸襟ア開キ申出己會サテキノ般事項兩言語合ハ考
ヘキルト日本大使ニ詣シ。

引續十三週間間種々点明カシ食達ヒラクスル寫ハ
ト日本上會談が行ハシ。我久々返シノ次諸点開スル我國態度
ア説明シ。即今合衆國が自衛上歐洲戰争捲込シ之場合於
日本對権軸關係ア明カニスル事必要他國國內問題对于
スル不干涉原則適用及日本軍中國領土カラ撤退中國及他
太平洋諸地域於通商關係平等原則適用及太平洋於
日本平和意圖確信ベ事等我國が本キルモハ平和手
段上テ物云々様廣汎團協定ア下ルトコトヲ協調シ。
日本側ハ五月十二日ニ彼等申本討スル完全ト回答ヲ強要シ
サタ。コト六月十一日大使日本側申本討スル假再成案形式ア

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我國、意向が計サシハ、ノ再成案ハ、合衆國が自衛上歐洲戰引
公了テモ日本、合衆國ニ對す行動ヲ起ス心要ナリトノ事ヲハ
キリセリ為、方法が接議サシテアタク。

中國、於日本軍駐屯、問題及中國、日本、間、經濟協調、問題
満足上解決、成シテケル為、尚一層、努力が爲サリバアルトコト
が提言サシタ。又合衆國が中國政府ニ对于援助ヲ中止スル意圖
アリトノ様、接言ハ除去サシテアタク；他種ノ提示サシタ、或更人間道化
爲乃至、我今が述べノ原則上提示サシテ解決案トヲ、致サハ爲、ナサ
シタニ、事アタク。

No. 19